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Prologue 
When I applied for a study abroad program in South Africa, I did not know much about 
the country’s past let alone its political history. In fact, my very reason for visiting South Africa 
was to learn about a country and region of which I knew nearly nothing. I sought to get outside 
of my comfort zone and confront my own privilege in an extreme way.  
On my first morning in Cape Town, South Africa, the program I was a part of scheduled 
us for a cable car ride up the famous Table Mountain. The views from the cable car were unlike 
anything I had ever seen; before me were mountains, ocean, beaches, and a city right in the 
middle of it all. I could not quite capture the full beauty of Cape Town in pictures, but the 
landscape was breathtaking to say the least. One of my most vivid memories from the four 
months I spent in Cape Town was in that cable car with a group of strangers silently entranced 
by the imagery, when out of nowhere the cable car operator simply said “wow” over the 
loudspeaker. We all laughed and continued looking outside the windows in admiration. At the 
time, I was unaware of the battles over this amazing land that had gone on for centuries and 
continue to go on today. 
 A couple of weeks after witnessing Cape Town through that cable car, I began an 
internship at the Legal Resources Centre (hereinafter “LRC”). At the time I had no idea how 
instrumental this organization was in altering policy across all issues in South Africa and 
offering legal help to the many individuals who walked through their doors every day. I was 
thrilled with my position under an attorney who specializes in gender equality and non-
discrimination, so when I heard all interns would temporarily be placed on a land and housing 
case I was not as excited because I had no interest in land or housing. However, that very case 
became the basis for my interest in South African land policy and now the inspiration for this 
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thesis. The historical injustices perpetrated by apartheid that I had only been learning about 
through class and readings took real life meaning when I started working on the case in Imizamo 
Yethu, also known as IY. I had the opportunity to work closely on the case by taking statements, 
attending court hearings, and even visiting the IY community. By the time I left Cape Town, the 
land and housing dilemma in IY remained unresolved and I was not sure what would come of it. 
 Back on U.S. soil following study abroad, I sought to enrich my academic experience and 
decided that I would do this through writing a senior honors thesis about land in South Africa. At 
first, I did not know why this topic jumped out at me; land was not necessarily the largest focus 
of my studies in Cape Town or my time at the LRC. I did not even extensively study South 
Africa at UNC, as I concentrate in Latin America as part of Global Studies major. Still, I knew 
that I would not only be able to write an entire thesis on the issue of land, but that I felt 
passionately about doing so. Everyone I talked to throughout the thesis process told me that I 
needed to write about a topic I felt great fervor for and for me this was it. I later realized through 
discussions with Dr. Weiler that my connection to this subject matter was because of IY.  
Accordingly, after discovering my own motivations for researching and writing about 
South African land, this thesis will engage in the issue of land in South Africa specifically as it 
relates to post-apartheid reform and its manifestation in the case of IY. I will examine land 
reform generally and pointedly in my efforts to explain how this unresolved issue still affects 
South Africans, and will continue to affect the country for years to come. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 With the world watching, Nelson Mandela was released from confinement on February 
11, 1990 after 27 years of imprisonment. Four years following his release, South Africa saw a 
transition to democracy and, ever since, a government led by the African National Congress 
(ANC). These transitions came with a new wave of hope and what could only be described as an 
optimistic future (Cherry, 2010). One of the most contentious issues on the table following these 
dramatic shifts was land. In the first year of democracy, 87% of all land was owned by a white1 
minority that comprised less than 9% of South Africa’s population (Jeter, 2018). The new 
government, with activist Nelson Mandela as president, had to address this drastic inequality that 
they feared would lead to political instability. ANC leaders during apartheid promised to fix the 
issue of land and now it was time for them to make good on those promises. 
  
I. Colonial history 
 One cannot understand land reform in contemporary South Africa without understanding 
the historical context, as briefly detailed in this section and the following section. South Africa 
had a long history of racial segregation and exploitation long before apartheid officially began. 
Dutch settlers arrived in the country in the 17th century, marking nearly 400 years since the 
original occupation and colonization (Secorun, 2018). The Dutch set out to colonize South 
Africa for purely economic reasons and thus South Africa was first colonized by the Dutch East 
India Company at Table Bay (Mitchell, 2009). Colonialism in South Africa was always about 
                                                 
1 The Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950 created distinct racial classifications in South 
Africa. People were divided into three main categories: white, black (meaning African, Native, 
or Bantu), and coloured (those of mixed race). Asian was added as a fourth category later (Union 
of South Africa, 1950). Although these categories are no longer legally significant, they are still 
widely used today and therefore I will adopt this categorization throughout this thesis. 
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resource extraction and exploitation, and this could offer one possible reason for the economic 
inequality that persists today.  
The original inhabitants of the land settled by the Dutch were the Khoikhoi and the San, 
hunter-gatherer people grouped together as “Khoisan.” The Khoisan fought back against 
European settlement, but were decimated by war and disease. Interestingly enough, the Khoisan 
are actually now considered “coloured”2 in South Africa’s racial classification system, even 
though they are the land’s original settlers. Their land was taken by the Dutch hundreds of years 
ago, but because the land debate in South Africa centers around black South Africans and land 
expropriation during the 20th century, the Khoisan are often forgotten in the discussion of land 
reform (Secorun, 2018). While the legal structure may have started with apartheid, clearly white 
Europeans began taking land from native South Africans long before the 20th century.  
The South African War, also known as the Boer War, led to a British takeover of South 
African land. The war began in 1899 and ended in 1902, with both casualties and costs far higher 
than anticipated (Donaldson, 2013). This war was fought on the South African landscape largely 
as a dispute between European colonists. The British exemplified neocolonialism tendencies in 
their success of conquering already colonized land. Once again, the fate of their own land was 
out of the hands of indigenous South Africans, like the Khoisan and others. Native South 
Africans only continued to see the deterioration of their land rights after the British officially 
took control.  
 
                                                 
2 Since “coloured” was a term utilized by white South Africans to describe mixed race South 
Africans in a legal context, some groups began to reject the official term after the fall of 
apartheid and use the phrase “so-called coloured.” However, there was some backlash as many 
coloured people asserted their identity as coloured and were not offended by the term. Both “so-
called coloured” and “coloured” are widely used today. For the purposes of this thesis, I will use 
the term “coloured.”  
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II. 20th century land policy 
During the 20th century, both before and during apartheid, the government in South 
Africa put legal structures in place to take land away from native South Africans. In 1913, the 
South African government passed a key piece of legislation that would lay the foundation for 
land inequalities still seen today: the Natives Land Act (Beinart & Delius, 2014). Although black 
South Africans comprised the vast majority of the population, only 7% of arable agricultural land 
was set aside on reserves for black South Africans (Bell, 2013). This share was later expanded to 
13% by the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 (Schneidman and Signé, 2018). After white 
South Africans forcibly took land belonging to black South Africans, these black South Africans 
settled on new reserves against their will. This Act was only the beginning of racial segregation 
under what would become apartheid and was not repealed until after apartheid’s official end in 
1991 (Bell, 2013). Under the Act, people were dispossessed from their land and their homes for 
generations. Interestingly enough, the intent of the Act was not to create vast inequalities in land 
ownership, but rather maintain land occupation as the norm and undermine black South Africans 
(Beinart & Delius, 2014). Clearly the result was more far reaching and continues to affect all 
South Africans, particularly the people and their families who had land taken in wake of the Act.  
 The following three acts were the most prominent pieces of legislation following the 
Natives Land Act and before formal apartheid. The Housing Act of 1920 enhanced segregation 
in public housing by requiring increased funding to build housing for the poor to be racially 
segregated, even with separate access roads. Later, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 
segregated urban residential areas and created “influx controls” to reduce access black South 
Africans had to the city. As a result, many black South Africans were restricted to townships and 
other informal settlements (Mabin, 1992). Furthermore, the Slums Act of 1934 allowed the 
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condemnation of buildings and neighborhoods by local authorities, who then could move people 
to new “housing estates” if funds were available (Mabin, 1992). This meant that local 
government could continue to segregate races by moving them to these new housing estates. 
However, the powers of these three acts were more limited than later legislation. Although they 
contributed to growing inequalities since the original Natives Land Act, they were not considered 
to be the harshest laws of the time. 
 With the official beginning of apartheid in 1948 following the election of the National 
Party, some of the most damaging land policies emerged, further segregating the races to the 
disadvantage of black and coloured South Africans. Most relevant to land inequalities, 
particularly in the urban sphere, was the Group Areas Act of 1950 (Bell, 2013). This Act 
enforced segregation of newly established “race groups” (see Footnote 1) in urban areas (Mabin, 
1992). Here began mass forced migrations of black and coloured South Africans from urban 
landscapes into the outskirts of cities in informal settlements, also known as townships. White 
South Africans were strategic in implementing this segregation by keeping South Africans of 
other races far away from where they lived, but not too far so they could still exploit their labor. 
Although townships were not created under the Group Areas Act and existed long before it came 
into fruition, they were certainly expanded in wake of the Act. 
 South Africa’s government before apartheid and under apartheid worked to ensure that 
black South Africans and coloured South Africans would be subject to discrimination under the 
law. This was not a unique circumstance, as this phenomenon of racial segregation and 
oppression existed all over the world during this period. The difference in the case of South 
Africa is how long these legal codes lasted, as apartheid ended in 1990 after more than 40 years 
as the formal law of the land (Bell, 2013). Of course, no one expected inequalities to be fixed 
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overnight, particularly in regards to land, but many found comfort in the fact that a political party 
headed by black South Africans would be their guide. ANC members themselves were very 
hopeful to solve the “land question.” 
 
III. Post-apartheid land policy 
 Although the ANC sought to address land inequalities and grant land rights to black and 
coloured South Africans, the outcome thus far has been disappointing. With the first democratic 
elections in 1994 and the ANC finally in power, many South Africans were hopeful for their 
future in general and specifically as it related to land reform (Leyshon, 2009). As previously 
mentioned, only 13% of land was apportioned to black South Africans under apartheid and thus 
at the fall of apartheid, this majority group still owned just a fraction of the land. The ANC had a 
goal of redistributing 30% of South Africa’s land in the first five years after their initial election, 
but more than 10 years later in 2005 only 3% of this land had actually been redistributed 
(Gjuvsland, 2009). Even in 2010, less than 5% of South Africa’s land had been effectively 
redistributed (Richen, 2010). This percentage has not climbed in any serious amount since 2010 
either. Many question the effectiveness and efficiency of the land reform process as well as the 
ANC’s ability to accomplish what they set out to do in terms of land redistribution (Makombe, 
2018).  
 Soon after the ANC’s election in 1994, the party passed the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act, constituting the first major piece of land legislation. The main purpose of this Act was to 
restore land to South Africans who had been forcibly removed as a result of the racially 
discriminatory practices of apartheid. As a caveat to these attempts at land reform, they only 
applied to those who had their land dispossessed in wake of the Natives Land Act (LARC). 
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Essentially that means if a person’s land was taken before 1913, i.e. during the period of primary 
colonization, they do not have a right to claim that land under this legislation. Black and 
coloured South Africans could submit land claims until 1998 (LARC). In 1997, the government 
released the White Paper containing three pillars of land policy: (1) restitution, (2) redistribution, 
and (3) tenure reform3 (Arkadiusz, 2017). Unfortunately, as already discussed, very few land 
claims have been settled as a result of the government’s inefficient process for land reform. The 
South African government gave too few resources to institutions handling land claims and was 
not forceful enough in persuading white farmers to sell their land. A revision to this Act, the 
Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act of 2014, opened up claims again until 2019, with 
priority given to those who filed before the 1998 deadline; however, this extended deadline was 
overturned in the courts. With thousands of new claims amassed in wake of the Amendment Act, 
the ANC is pressed to find a solution to the decades-old controversy. 
 The central strategy for land reform has been a “willing-buyer, willing-seller” model 
(Cousins, 2013). This model is predominantly used to handle rural land claims. Black South 
Africans who claimed their land was taken from them during apartheid had to submit legitimate 
documentation proving that the land once belonged to them or their families (Richen, 2010). 
Though this in itself was already a daunting task due to the inadequacy in official documentation 
for land ownership decades ago, many South Africans managed to gather the appropriate forms 
and submit their claims. But of course, willing-buyer, willing-seller depends on the consent of 
white South African farmers to sell their land to the government for the market price (Richen, 
2010). This system was meant to be the basis for massive land redistribution. However, those 
                                                 
3 Land tenure refers to the terms surrounding land ownership, and how this ownership is 
solidified and managed. Tenure reform concerns intentional changes to the conditions of land 
ownership, meaning a readjustment of the terms of the land. This type of reform is meant to 
solidify a person’s right to their land (Adams et al., 1999). 
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who implemented this program did not foresee how few white farmers would be willing to sell 
their land. A main worry of white farmers concerns their lack of faith in the government to 
follow through on compensation if they do choose to give up their land. The government has 
consistently under-resourced institutions that handle land reform, so it is reasonable to assume 
that land transfers and compensation will take years to process. White farmers’ unwillingness to 
sell their land to the government has led to stalemate in the willing-buyer, willing-seller model, 
and thus a significant contributing factor to the overall ineffectiveness and inefficiency in land 
reform (Richen, 2010). 
 Most recently in South African politics, Cyril Ramaphosa became president of the ANC 
and therefore the president of the country. His administration announced a planned change to the 
Constitution which will make expropriation of land without compensation much easier. This is 
presented as the ANC’s fix to the inefficiencies in the current land reform process and the still 
vastly unequal land ownership in South Africa. Not surprisingly, this proposed amendment has 
been broadly compared to Zimbabwean land reform, which led to land grabs, destruction of 
property rights, and devastating decreases in foreign investment that drove Zimbabwe into 
economic crisis (Monteiro, 2018).4 Many attribute the sudden change in attitude of the ANC to 
electoral concern. In the last few years, the Economic Freedom Fighters has emerged as a far-left 
political party committed to economic equality, with an emphasis on land equality (Malema, 
2018). Fearing that they could lose even more seats in parliament to the EFF, the ANC has 
ramped up its land reform rhetoric to appeal to the frustrations of many South African voters. 
                                                 
4 Most scholars who have written on South African land reform have compared the process to 
Zimbabwe in one way or another. In 2000, Zimbabwe implemented land reform resulting in 
immense violence. White farmers were forced off of their land by mobs or evicted, and while 
many saw this as a victory, Zimbabwe’s economy has not recovered from the decreased land 
productivity and limited foreign investment (Kadirire, 2018). For the most part, Zimbabwe is 
discussed as a warning sign of what not to do. 
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 The “land question” as many South Africans refer to it, is yet to be fully answered. When 
the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act was passed in 2014, it opened up land claims for 
five additional years (LARC). This allowed those who were not able to file claims within the 
first five-year window a chance to claim their land, but also threatens to hinder the efficiency of 
the land reform process further. Additionally, around 50% of land that has been designated for 
restitution has not yet been transferred to the beneficiary (LARC).  
There are conflicting opinions surrounding the future of land reform and whether it will 
bring about an actual resolution or destroy South Africa’s economy (Richen, 2010). In the past, 
the government has tried to keep the peace among South Africans and appease foreign investors 
by sticking to a willing-buyer, willing-seller model of land reform. The ANC has faced pressure 
from international institutions and feared that foreign investment would implode if expropriation 
occurred. At the same time, the ANC has not found a way to instill confidence in its land 
redistribution program and government institutions continue to be abhorrently slow in settling 
land claims. The ANC, which has held majority rule in Parliament since the first democratic 
elections in 1994, has failed to answer to the land question nearly 30 years after the fall of 
apartheid. 
 
IV. Why does this matter? 
 After reviewing how South Africa got to where it is, there remains another burning 
question: why does this all matter? The most important answer to this question comes from the 
people who lost their land after 1913, principally black South Africans. South Africa continues to 
be the most unequal nation in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.63 in 2015 (The World 
Bank, 2018). In fact, inequality has only increased since the fall of apartheid, with black South 
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Africans most at risk for living in poverty (Greenwood, 2018). This inequality is inextricably tied 
to the issue of land, as the top 1% of South Africans still hold over 70% of the land (Greenwood, 
2018). Leaders who sought to correct the harms caused by apartheid have only deepened the 
grasp inequality has on the country. 
 The ANC made many promises of swift land reform, but did not devote sufficient 
resources to accomplish what it set out to do. Inefficient methods for handling land reform have 
been coupled with political fear. The ANC fears economic crisis and failure of new policy that 
could lead to devastating electoral losses. Accordingly, the years have dragged on and the norm 
of ineffective and inefficient land reform has endured. Until the EFF achieved significant 
political standing, the ANC were not motivated to change its lasting policies. Many South 
Africans who lost their land during the 20th century have spent years waiting to see if they will 
ever receive justice for their loss. This failure to handle land reform appropriately reflects in 
individual circumstances, specifically in the case of Imizamo Yethu (“IY”). Ultimately, this 
thesis is about the government’s inability to deal equitably with land issues because it fails to 
understand the needs of the people involved, both nationally and locally. Remedying inequality 
falls into the hands of the government, and in South Africa this remedy requires an intervention 
in land reform. 
 
V. Research question 
 This thesis centers around the following question: How has the South African 
government handled post-apartheid land reform and how does this compare to their original 
promises? The “South African government” is meant to be left broad, referring principally to the 
ANC nationally and, as can be seen through the IY case in later chapters, the City of Cape Town. 
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My argument uses proof from the creeping pace of the land reform process, as reflected 
nationwide and in the IY case, and the subsequent disappointing results. Most scholarly research 
on land in South Africa focuses on rural communities and farmland. This thesis will cover some 
rural land disputes, but also expand to detail processes of urban land reform in the post-apartheid 
era.  
 The Group Areas Act widely impacted urban settings and was a large contributing factor 
to the racial segregation still seen in South African cities today, particularly in Cape Town. There 
are parallel stories of rural land expropriation and urban land expropriation that both relate to 
each other and reveal differences in policy. Disproportionately distributed rural land produces 
much of the alarming inequality in South Africa, but based on my own experience and interests I 
have decided to focus on the urban sphere as an underrepresented and vastly important topic in 
land reform.  
 This interest in urban settings comes from the IY case directly and my time in Cape 
Town. South Africa is one of the most urbanized countries in the entirety of Africa; over two-
thirds of the population live in urban areas (Mwanza, 2018). Why then, has the government 
focused on rural land as opposed to aiding the other two-thirds of their population? While some 
cities like Johannesburg and Pretoria, have become more integrated since the 1990s, Cape Town 
remains a notorious example of land inequality. Urban land in all of South Africa is still widely 
possessed by the wealthier, typically white, minority or held by the government, but this reigns 
particularly true in Cape Town (Mwanza, 2018). Black South Africans only hold 7% of 
registered, formal property within cities. As I will discuss in chapter four, IY resides within an 
area where segregation is still inordinately apparent. Urban land involves affordable housing, 
quality of education, access to healthcare, and so many other intertwined issues (Mwanza, 2018). 
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Although I will not discuss all of these matters in detail, combined they reveal underlying 
systemic issues affecting urban-dwelling South Africans, particularly those in Cape Town.  
 In this thesis, I will argue that land reform has not been handled effectively or efficiently, 
and that the government continues to place hardships on black South Africans most affected by 
land inequalities. I have chosen this argument because of the both the indications of my research 
and the government inefficiencies illustrated through the IY case. As established, South Africa is 
still the world’s most unequal country, and has even become more unequal since the 1990s. Land 
has not been redistributed in any meaningful amount and that can only be attributed to 
government failure. The IY case is a vehicle to demonstrate this larger picture. In both situations, 
the government treats the people involved as issues requiring resolution rather than humanizing 
the needs of those affected. Although the national government and the local government are 
separate functioning entities for the most part, their attitudes towards citizens under their 
authority are very similar. Both have let their constituents down with disappointing results.  I 
recognize that land reform affects South Africans who beyond those who are just black or white, 
but for the purposes of this thesis I will focus on the relationship between black land ownership 
and white land ownership because the majority of South Africa’s population is black with most 
of the wealth in the white minority. As I will continue to demonstrate in this thesis, there were 
many promises made by the government, specifically the ANC, after the fall of apartheid with 
very discouraging outcomes. I will present ample evidence to this effect. 
 
VI. Methodology 
 Throughout the course of this thesis, my scope will begin large and then narrow. As 
discussed in the next section, I will give context for the wider discussion first. The main part of 
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this thesis analyzes a particular case study in an informal settlement, or township, outside of 
Cape Town named Imizamo Yethu. IY is a community made up of black South Africans, many 
of whom live without access to electricity, reliable running water, or a sewage system. They have 
been plagued with numerous, devastating fires over time and now with eviction notices from the 
City of Cape Town over the last 18 months. IY represents a prime example of unresolved land 
issues and how they are dealt with; residents in the township are still suffering disastrous losses 
from apartheid and its fallout. South Africa continues to top charts with the worst inequality in 
the world (Beaubien, 2018). As an avenue for building wealth, land, or lack thereof, is a major 
contributing factor to this inequality.  
 In short, the primary method this thesis utilizes is case study analysis. The documents in 
the analysis are court records obtained via the LRC. Every document that I use has been filed in 
South African civil court and is publicly available. The two parties in the civil suit are the City 
and the LRC on behalf of IY. The LRC took on this case in the eleventh hour to try to prevent 
the eviction of approximately 120 families in IY. As I will show in my analysis, the residents 
who could be potentially evicted are willing to compromise with the City, but the City has 
ignored their requests for clarity and has routinely demonstrated resistance towards working with 
residents. Although this case is not a land claim specifically, the way it has been handled speaks 
to the larger picture of the South African land question. 
 Before diving into the remainder of my thesis, I want to recognize how I fit into the 
conversation about South African land reform. I am presenting my findings based on conclusions 
from my own research and experiences. I am an American university student who spent four 
months in Cape Town and was inspired by my time there to pursue this as a research topic. I do 
not represent the residents of IY or the views of the LRC; this thesis is simply my analysis both 
 
 
18 
of previous land reform research and court documents filed by the LRC on behalf of IY. The 
research I have done comes from a place of interest, not one of authority or superiority. 
 
VII. Chapter roadmap 
 Following this introduction, my thesis contains a literature review examining major 
works around the topics of land reform and restitution. In the literature review, I critically engage 
with a range of sources from books to scholarly articles to commentaries. I also delve further into 
the Group Areas Act and its effect on the South African landscape. I address the common themes 
throughout the literature including the importance of land in South African culture, rhetoric 
around forced migration, racial polarization around land, and the utilization of law in solving the 
land issue. I express my own thoughts in comparison to the works of land scholars and highlight 
which predominant elements are crucial to the contextualization of the IY case study. 
 After the literature review, the third chapter speaks to the real changes that have occurred 
in land reform within the political atmosphere, including across changes in national leadership 
and urban reform specifically. Additionally, I explore statistics and studies on land claims since 
1994, and what has resulted from many of those claims. Then, the fourth chapter transitions to a 
discussion about the IY community and the legal case against them. I give background on the 
case and establish the ramifications that eviction could mean for this community. I clarify the 
intentions of the motions on both sides and analyze their meanings. Lastly, my conclusion 
explains how the IY case fits back into land reform in the larger framework and considers what 
the future could look like for IY and land reform in South Africa as a whole.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 As a divisive and highly politicized topic, there exists a wide range of sources that 
analyze land reform. Everyone holds an opinion on land reform, either based on research, 
personal belief, or both, and many express their thoughts via written platforms. In the chapter 
that follows, I will analyze major works that I have come across that advance my analysis of land 
reform and may offer distinct solutions to the land question overall. In my reading, I have found 
that there are a few major points of both agreement and disagreement among writers. I have 
narrowed those points down to the following, as reflected in the section headings: the 
controversy over forced migrations; the importance of land for South Africans; how expectations 
have had to come to terms with the reality of the situation; the clear racial divide in the dialogue 
surrounding land reform; and the emphasis from all sides of how the law should be utilized to 
advance land reform. I will engage with many sources that critically examine the preceding 
issues and offer explanations for the phenomena seen in today’s discussion of South African land 
reform. 
 
I. Forced migrations 
 The Group Areas Act of 1950 caused the largest forced migrations of South Africans 
over the course of apartheid (Surplus People Project, 1983). By the 1980s, 3.5 million South 
Africans had been forcibly removed from their homes into Bantustans5 or other undesirable areas 
(Kgatla, 2013). While some coloured and Asian South Africans were affected, the vast majority 
                                                 
5 Bantustans, also known as “Bantu Homelands,” were created by the apartheid government to 
confine black South Africans to specific ethnic territories, usually only permitted to come into 
white areas for work. These lands furthered segregationist goals and left black South Africans 
with very little available land (Phillips, 2018).  
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of people affected by the Act were black; the Act affected very few white South Africans. Those 
3.5 million people forcibly removed from their homes represented over 10% of South Africa’s 
population at the time. These removals sometimes involved violence stemming from extreme 
action from the government and police brutality (Surplus People Project, 1983). These forced 
migrations, particularly outside of urban areas, expanded the township system that is still the 
norm today.  
 Selaelo Kgatla describes the racism underlying forced migrations initiated by the 
apartheid government (2013). Under the Group Areas Act, racial groups were assigned to 
townships based on their racial classification. The apartheid government promoted the removals 
under the pretense of peace and prosperity for all South Africans; it wanted to keep South Africa 
“racially pure” (Kgatla, 2013: 121). According to Kgatla, the forced migrations were 
strategically oriented by the government under the guise of being beneficial to all groups (2013). 
The government cited security, ethnic purity, homeland policy, and more in their justification for 
the removals. In reality, almost no white South Africans were affected by forced migrations. 
Black South Africans paid the price of relocation. Kgatla sees removals as “one of the most 
humiliating experiences” black South Africans experienced during apartheid, and one of the 
most detrimental in the end (2013: 120).  
 In another piece on forced migrations, Holly Reed relates the past trauma of forced 
migrations to restrictions in geographical mobility today (2013). The apartheid government was 
both pointed in how it presented the removals as beneficial to all peoples, and how it relocated 
black South Africans. In townships, black South Africans could be far enough away to avoid 
mixing with whites, but not too far to commute to work. The most common type of migration in 
South Africa today is what Reed refers to as “commuter migrants” who live in compounds at 
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work so that they do not have to make the daily trek to and from where their families reside, but 
commute regularly from rural areas or townships (2013: 73). Even after being forced out of 
urban settings, white South Africans have still managed to exploit the labor of black South 
Africans from the dawn of forced removals under apartheid to the present. To Reed, forced 
migrations created ongoing obstacles to freedom to movement (2013). Although much of the 
post-apartheid migration has led South Africans back to living in cities, not many black South 
Africans who experienced forced removals are able to return to their former areas of residence. 
Reed recognizes how the massive forced migrations have had lasting consequences on the 
informal segregation in contemporary South Africa. 
 In a book written while South Africa was still experiencing apartheid rule, Laurine 
Platzky and Cherryl Walker consider how people understood their own forced removals (1985). 
Most were given excuses like businesses wanted to establish new industries on their land or their 
current home fell outside a Bantustan. Most people did not know why they had been relocated, 
only that the apartheid government had the power to take control of their land and did so 
accordingly (Platzky & Walker, 1985). Many white South Africans pushed for the removal of 
black or coloured communities from their area, citing reasons such as not wanting to have black 
people as their neighbors, no longer requiring the services of black workers on their farms, and 
“good land going to waste” (Platzky & Walker, 1985: 63). While the apartheid government tried 
to disguise forced removals as good for everyone, this ruse did not fool most South Africans. 
Black South Africans knew the apartheid government sought to undermine them, while white 
South Africans saw these forced removals as a way to remove unwanted neighbors in the name 
of racism.  
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 Clearly, forced migrations are crucial to telling the story of land, especially in urban 
areas. These migrations led to unequal distribution of land in South Africa that requires post-
apartheid land reform. There may never be racial distributions across land and neighborhoods 
equal to those prior to 1950. The apartheid government carried out force migrations under the 
facade of benefits to all racial groups. Land remains unevenly distributed across South Africa 
and this can be partially attributed to the restrictions to freedom of movement for black South 
Africans. These restrictions are both in the past and very much tangled with the present. 
 
II. The importance of land 
 Land in South Africa holds significant cultural meaning and is deeply intertwined with 
identity. Issues regarding land have been at the top of the political agenda in the last two decades 
(Chigara, 2013). As already established, land has become a political rallying point for South 
Africans. This has been especially true recently with the rise of the far left in the form of the 
EFF. In the documentary Promised Land, the audience sees first-hand how attached both white 
and black South Africans are to their land. White landowners talk of how their fathers and their 
fathers’ fathers lived on the land, and how they grew up there alongside the black workers 
employed by their families (Richen, 2010). In contrast, black land claimants want the land back 
that their ancestors were forced to give up ownership to as means of reparations. Clearly seen 
through the film, white and black South Africans feel as though they have an ancestral right to 
the land and do not want to compromise on giving up even a portion of it (Richen, 2010).  
 In Oral History, Community, and Displacement, Sean Field introduces the expropriation 
of land and forced migrations under apartheid as “cultural traumas” (2012). Land communicates 
a sense of belonging and a sense of security (Field, 2012). Many South Africans were stripped of 
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these comforts, or may have never known them at all as a result of colonization, imperialism, and 
apartheid. Additionally, Field emphasizes that the few South Africans that have either gained 
their land back or received compensation still suffer poverty and emotional deprivation (2012). 
When a South African regains land that was taken from them as a result of apartheid, that does 
not discount all the hardships they faced up until that point; those harsh memories and the 
feelings associated with those memories stick with a person throughout their life and may never 
be resolved. This relates to Ben Chigara’s comments on land reform when he introduced the 
psychological “invisible legacy of apartheid rule” (2013). Post-apartheid South Africa is 
sometimes referred to as “so-called” post-apartheid South Africa for this very reason. The early 
1990s may have brought an official end to apartheid, but it did not bring an end to enduring 
cultural trauma.  
 Bernadette Atuahene examines how land reform has happened and how people who have 
made successful land claims come to decisions in handling their restitution awards (Atuahene, 
2014a). As discussed, land reform in South Africa has been a long and exhausting process, with 
very few people actually receiving redistributed land. Even after long fought battles in land claim 
cases, Atuahene states that most people actually choose financial compensation in the end, even 
though land and housing are the more valuable restitution awards (2014a). This may not 
necessarily have to do with the importance South Africans place on land, but rather signs of an 
ineffective and inefficient government process. Most people cite poor institutional structure and 
worry over ever actually receiving the transfer of land as reasons they chose financial 
compensation (2014a). Many who actually do wait for the transfer of land almost always cite 
cultural and political reasons, mainly the land as a “delayed reward for a hard-won fight” 
(Atuahene, 2014a: 158).  
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South African land has considerable meaning for all racial groups and there are strong 
opinions on all sides, but some argue that South Africa faces greater issues outside of land. 
James L. Gibson identifies the three biggest problem he believes South Africa faces today: 
unemployment, HIV/AIDS, and crime (2009). In the piece by Field, he sees South Africa’s 
greatest failure not as their inability to provide significant land reform, but rather their response 
to the HIV/AIDS crisis (2012). However, Gibson and Field fail to recognize that poverty, 
unemployment, crime, and disease are all inextricably linked to one another, and also linked with 
land reform. These systems of persecution intertwine and work together to impact the already 
most vulnerable South Africans concurrently.  
 
III. Expectations versus reality 
 When the ANC came to power in 1994 following South Africa’s first democratic 
elections, everyone expected change. South Africans who had been marginalized since the 
arrival of the Dutch saw this as a new beginning. However, it is evident that the ANC did not 
stick to its revolutionary rhetoric once in power. This is especially relevant for land policy. As 
established, many black South Africans were forcibly removed from their land during the 20th 
century. Land holds intimate value, as both a way to build wealth over generations and emotional 
attachment that comes with tradition and culture. After the transition to democracy, the ANC 
with president Nelson Mandela made it a goal to correct this wrong. 
In an article by Ben Cousins, he reviews the complex elements of the land question 
(2017). He argues that land reform needs to be completely reinvented, rather than simply fixed. 
Cousins recognizes that land reform as it stands has been slow and unsuccessful (2017). After the 
 
 
25 
era of Mandela, Thabo Mbeki6 expanded expropriation, reconsidered willing-buyer, willing-
seller, and created a more proactive role for the state in the land reform process. One of Jacob 
Zuma’s three top priorities was land reform. Still, neither of these leaders was able to 
successfully accomplish significant progress in land reform (Cousins, 2017). Cousins states that 
“land reform has barely altered agrarian structure of South Africa” meaning that most land 
claims have not been implemented in their entirety and have not affected South Africa’s 
inequality to any significant ends (2017: 142).  
 
IV. Racial divide 
 Land reform is one of the most divisive issues in South Africa, and that division typically 
falls along racial lines. As land scholar Ben Cousins says “racialized inequalities in land holdings 
are a ticking time bomb” (2018). The EFF sustains electoral growth in areas where black South 
Africans are most affected by inefficiency of land reform, while promoting land grabs and 
violence if necessary (Cousins, 2018). It is reasonable to think the EFF would turn to violence, 
given South Africa’s history and their radical leader Julius Malema. On the issue of race, 
Malema recently said “we have not called for the killing of white people...at least for now. I 
can’t guarantee the future” (Huffington Post, 2018). Cousins argues that the government’s failure 
has made the deep racial divide on land much worse, an issue that should have been solved long 
before the now (2018). 
 The primary controversy over settling land claims between white and black South 
Africans is the question of who has the rights to the land. Both sides stand their ground in 
                                                 
6 Thabo Mbeki was the president of South Africa from 1999 to 2008, immediately following 
Nelson Mandela. Jacob Zuma succeeded Mbeki as leader of the ANC and South Africa’s 
president from 2009 to 2018. Cyril Ramaphosa is the current president.  
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believing that the true ownership should reflect their proclaimed right to the land. Ruth Hall 
considers the government’s dilemma in handling claims of historical authority over land from 
black South Africans and the property rights of white South Africans who currently inhabit the 
land (2004). During the time this article was written, Hall debates how the government will 
handle this racial divide in the future, with no clear answer. More than a decade later, the answer 
has yet to be seen and the stalemate in land redistribution persists. South Africa is no closer to 
compromising on land reform and bridging the racial divide in understanding land than more 
than a decade ago.  
 In Sean Field’s analysis of what he terms the “big three” in South Africa (unemployment, 
HIV/AIDS, and crime), he does state that the racial divide in the land question gives the issue a 
nuanced meaning outside of simply a political topic (2012). In his research, he found that black 
South Africans cite advantages held by whites as a result of apartheid and inability to recover 
from colonialism as the most widely accepted reason for land inequality (Field, 2012). While 
white privilege is definitely one causal factor, this logic deflects responsibility from the 
government for its poor approach to land reform post-apartheid. According to Field, no issue in 
South Africa is more polarizing among racial groups than land. Field states that “political fires 
fueled by deeply felt senses of injustice are difficult indeed to extinguish,” offering an 
explanation to both the continued racial divide in land and the constant discourse around land in 
the political sphere (2012: 218).  
 In adding to the discussion of a racial divide among opinions on land reform, Godswill 
Makombe provides concrete reasoning for the racial divide with possible solutions. He again 
reviews how South Africa structured their land reform program and why willing-seller, willing-
buyer has been ineffective in the past (Makombe, 2018). Makombe identifies a key missing 
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element of land reform as a process and not necessarily solely a policy procedure, that element 
being a “missing conversation.” To Makombe, the absent factor in the land reform program is 
the “conversation that has not taken place between the previous farm owners and the 
beneficiaries” (2018: 1416). There continues to be a distinct us versus them mentality from both 
sides of the issue, eliminating any chance of compromise between groups. He argues that the 
government should facilitate this conversation as a pillar of the land reform program (Makombe, 
2018). The main flaw in Makombe’s piece is his assumption that once these groups come 
together to talk, they will be able to set aside their differences in a compromise. As proven, land 
is an issue deeply embedded into both white and black South Africans, and there is no guarantee 
that compromise could ever happen. Both sides believe they should not have to compromise, and 
until there is a fundamental shift in the attitudes of South Africans, this “missing conservation” 
Makombe describes would be hopeless from the start.  
 As demonstrated, the racial divide dominates discussions around land reform. When the 
ANC came to power in 1994 after decades as a revolutionary anti-apartheid movement during 
apartheid, it took a surprisingly gentle approach to land reform. The party catered to both sides of 
the argument, attempting to carefully avoid any disruptions major changes in land reform might 
bring to South Africa. The ANC placed great value on individual freedom and the right to 
property, which was a surprising turn from its former radical rhetoric. To reiterate Cousins’ 
statement, racial inequalities in land create tensions that have built up decades after apartheid. 
The ANC is pressed to find a solution sooner rather than later. 
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V. Rule of law 
 When considering South African land reform, it is necessary to examine the rule of law 
and its role in the process. This looks at how the law is used to structure land reform and move 
the process forward. While the previous section discussed the great racial divide over land 
reform, interestingly enough the rule of law is a topic where nearly everyone agrees. According 
to various authors, for the most part South Africans across all races agree that the rule of law is 
necessary in land reform. This notion reveals great respect for the law and other legal framework 
in South Africa. Of course, all groups disagree over how exactly the law should be utilized in 
land reform going forward, but most South Africans see a need to obey the laws set forward by 
the government. The exception to this would be the EFF and its supporters, who do believe 
violence and land grabs may be necessary. 
 James L. Gibson identifies the most significant common support over land reform among 
South Africans as the rule of law to drive land reconciliation (2009). As Gibson describes, land is 
an issue of heavy concern, especially to potential beneficiaries of new land policy, and should be 
guided by comprehensive and informed policy rather than disorder. In a commentary by Derick 
Fay, he explains the necessity of rule of law in land reform going forward (2018). He emphasizes 
the need to resolve land claims faster, but not in an arbitrary way. Fay believes the government 
should be responsible for this process and in the future, legislators should create a more 
sustainable procedure for handling land claims (2018). While Gibson emphasizes popular 
agreement over rule of law, Fay necessitates its value for prospective land policy. 
 In an account by Ben Chigara, he discusses the rule of law as both common ground and a 
complicating factor (2013). He sees the Zimbabwe example as the primary factor behind this line 
of thought. To Chigara, Zimbabwe is an “extreme and sad example” of how land reform can go 
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haywire (2013: 89). As a country that was relatively stable until 2000, land seizures in the 21st 
century caused massive economic and political problems. Chigara even goes so far to say that the 
land grabs in Zimbabwe mirror similar tactics during the colonial period, with the exception 
being the racial role reversal. He sees the rule of law as a complicating factor because of how 
Zimbabwe responded with violence after changes to the law that favored black Zimbabweans. 
For Chigara, the disregard for rule of law reflects unresolved issues of colonial injustice (2013). 
While Chigara’s analysis of the situation is useful, there may be a way to approach land reform 
using the law that would not lead to land grabs like the ones seen in Zimbabwe. The rule of law 
does not necessarily have to be a complex factor in the equation, but rather one that can settle 
land reform in the future if implemented properly. Clearly, South Africans have respect for rule 
of law based on research, and the government should take advantage of this in crafting land 
reform policy. 
 Although most South Africans agree on the use of the rule of law, the EFF is a notable 
exception. In the past, the EFF insinuated the use of violence if its demands were not met. In a 
way, the EFF mirrors the politics of the ANC during apartheid; violence if necessary to advance 
the interests of native Africans. While this may not be the most politically ideal scenario, their 
strategy has gained support from the most frustrated South Africans. This could represent a new 
lack of confidence in the rule of law as a system for helping black South Africans, or a lack of 
confidence in the ANC as a ruling party. Due to pressure from the EFF, the ANC plans to amend 
the Constitution to allow for expropriation without compensation (Kumwenda-Mtambo, 2018). 
Although there are many critiques of this scheduled change, it would most likely be respected by 
South Africans if formed around following the rule of law and eliminating opportunities for 
violence. 
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 However, the amendment to the Constitution might perform better in theory than in 
practice. In theory, many South Africans support the rule of the law, but this may only be true if 
the rule of law operates in their favor. The same constitutional amendment is precisely what led 
to the crisis in Zimbabwe, meaning that reform by rule of law can have unintended and less than 
legal consequences. In the opinion of many land scholars, the most effective way to overcome 
institutional inefficiency that has plagued land reform for decades would be properly resourced 
administrative services that deal with land claims and more robust incentives for white 
landowners to sell their land. In any solution to the land question, the rule of law is a major 
consideration and can be an advantage to policymakers if applied in the right way. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 South African land reform has a few key themes, most notably the importance of land to 
all groups, the racial divide over the issue of land, and how the rule of law factors into land 
reform. These themes stem from forced migrations during apartheid and the expectations for land 
reform set forward by the ANC compared with what the ANC has actually accomplished. Land 
scholars all offer their unique perspective on how South Africa should handle land reform going 
forward, whether the government should focus on easing racial tensions, avoiding a similar 
situation to Zimbabwe, or devoting more resources to the process overall. The next chapter will 
be an introduction into the legal framework around land reform as well as how the post-apartheid 
ANC government has specifically dealt with land reform up until this point. 
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Chapter 3: Legal and Political Overview 
 In previous chapters, I established the basis for my argument around land reform and 
reviewed major concepts regarding the discussion of land in South Africa. In the chapter that 
follows, I first outline the politics of post-apartheid land reform across different ANC 
administrations. Then, I narrow the focus to urban land and its relation to the rest of my thesis. I 
give specific statistics and numbers on post-apartheid land claims. Finally, I explain the 
transition the next chapter makes into the case study that will be the focus of the remainder of 
this thesis: Imizamo Yethu, or IY. This chapter communicates a more precise picture of the 
specific legal framework surrounding land reform and sets up precedent for the IY case in the 
next chapter.  
 
I. Land across politics 
 When Nelson Mandela became South Africa’s first ANC president in 1994, prospects for 
the country seemed hopeful. After 27 years in prison for his activism under apartheid, Mandela 
was the leader many South Africans had been awaiting. His new government included land 
rights in the Constitution, stating in Section 25(5) that “the state must take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to 
gain access to land on an equitable basis” (Parliament of South Africa, 2016: 10-11). All 
legislative and executive actions that have followed this provision are required to adhere to this 
principle. In his land reform program, Mandela promised to “address the poverty that apartheid 
created” (Mseteka, 1998). The program involved negotiations between white landowners and 
South Africans who lost their land during apartheid (Mseteka, 1998). It was formally launched 
on February 28, 1995. Two years later in 1997, the government published their official White 
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Paper on Land Policy to guide future land legislation in the country (Parliament of South Africa, 
2016). 
Even though the ANC criticized capitalism during apartheid, it relied on the World Bank 
for financial support after coming to power. While the World Bank did seek out South Africa as 
a partner rather than the other way around, the World Bank was not South Africa’s only option 
(Smith, 2008). With opinions on entering into a relationship with the World Bank sharply 
divided even amongst the ANC, Mandela’s administration re-established ties and pursued a more 
liberal economic structure (Smith, 2008). At the time, the ANC was in the midst of its own 
transition from a revolutionary movement to an established political party. The party did not 
need to bring World Bank regulations to South Africa; the country was stable enough 
economically to have pursued other avenues for development. Rather, the ANC actively chose to 
make the World Bank a part of its vision for a post-apartheid South Africa. Under pressure from 
the World Bank, the Mandela administration established use of the willing-buyer, willing-seller 
model. This model severely curtailed the ANC’s original land reform goals by placing 
restrictions on land redistribution.  
As discussed in chapter one, Mandela and the ANC stated that it would redistribute 30% 
of South Africa’s land within the first five years of their rule. This goal was part of the first land 
reform program in 1994 and included in the White Paper (Parliament of South Africa, 2016). By 
the time the deadline rolled around in 1999, only 1% of land had actually been redistributed; 10 
years after the program’s inception in 2004, only 3% of land had been redistributed (Parliament 
of South Africa, 2016: 15). In 2013, about 6.5% of land had been redistributed compared to the 
then almost 20-year-old goal of 30% (Parliament of South Africa, 2016: 15). White landowners 
held onto their property titles in Mandela’s post-apartheid South Africa, with the government 
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offering market value compensation to purchase their land. While this was considered a 
concession to white South Africans, black South Africans still believed that the ANC would 
effectively and efficiently transfer back the land that was taken from them. Now it is evident that 
white South Africans got what they desired, but black South Africans are still waiting for their 
end of the deal to become a reality (Atuahene, 2014b). 
 After Mandela formally stepped down from politics in 1999, Thabo Mbeki took control 
of the ANC and the country between 1999 and 2008. Although Mbeki had spent 28 years in exile 
and returned to South Africa only after Mandela’s release from prison, ANC leaders did not 
consider him to be a legitimate revolutionary (CNN Library, 2018). While Mandela was 
supported on the basis of his popularity as a leader, Mbeki was only supported because he had 
been put in a leadership position (Gumede, 2013). Mbeki was less of a symbolic leader like 
Mandela and more of a technocrat. On land reform and other economic policy, Mbeki tended to 
embrace neoliberal structures that exacerbated South Africa’s extreme income inequality. In line 
with this set of beliefs, Mbeki followed the 1993 World Bank’s land reform principles of willing-
buyer, willing-seller. He saw value in the World Bank’s insistence on the primacy of private 
property rights (Gumede, 2007). His administration primarily focused on a state-purchase-and-
leasing model for land redistribution, which also impeded reliable land tenure (see Footnote 3) 
by granting the state ownership of the land rather than the individual citizen (Parliament of South 
Africa, 2016). South Africans criticized Mbeki for implementing policies that hurt the black 
majority, the very people the ANC claimed to be protecting. At the end of his second term, the 
ANC forced Mbeki’s resignation (Gumede, 2007).  
 Following Mbeki’s nine-year period as president and subsequent resignation, Jacob Zuma 
took over as the country’s leader in 2009 until 2018. Zuma focused on socio-economic 
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development in his term as president, which necessarily meant improving the effectiveness of 
land reform (Arkadiusz, 2017). He called for an abandonment of the willing-buyer, willing-seller 
model in favor of “‘expropriation in the public interest’ and with ‘just and equitable’ 
compensation,” as provided for in Section 25 of the Constitution (Parliament of South Africa, 
2016: 12). Although the Zuma administration did not completely abandon the willing-buyer, 
willing-seller model, it did not prioritize it as much as previous administrations. Since 2011, the 
only state land redistribution method has been a Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy, or PLAS, 
originally created in 2006 under Mbeki. Through this plan, the state purchases land and leases it 
to South Africans rather than transferring the land to beneficiaries, hence the uncertainty of land 
tenure (Parliament of South Africa, 2016). However, under a newer, revised version of PLAS, 
these land transfers are only available to tenants after an initial 30-year lease and then optional 
20-year renewal, meaning that a tenant must rent from the government for 50 years before being 
eligible to have the land transferred to them (Parliament of South Africa, 2016). The goal of 
PLAS is eventual redistribution to private ownership after long term leases, but this portion of 
PLAS has yet to come to fruition.  
Aided by Zuma’s lack of progress on land reform and other similar social welfare issues, 
the EFF emerged as a direct response to what many South Africans see as a failure of the ANC. 
Since its formation, the EFF have advocated for radical leftist policies including land 
redistribution by any means necessary, even if that entails violence (Nieftagodien, 2015). Its 
leader Julius Malema is an expelled member of the ANC Youth League (Nieftagodien, 2015). 
Feeling pressure from the left as a result of the EFF’s rising popularity, Zuma later became more 
populist in his speeches on land reform, trying to appeal to former ANC supporters turned EFF 
allies (Arkadiusz, 2017). Near the end of his term, Zuma even called for a constitutional change 
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to allow land expropriation without compensation, but did not take any concrete steps towards 
ensuring this outcome (Graham, 2017). Land redistribution reached its slowest pace since 1995 
during Zuma’s time as president (Parliament of South Africa, 2016).  
 At the beginning of 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa, former aid to Mandela and political rival of 
Mbeki, became the new president. The general public views Ramaphosa as more of a Mandela 
figure, which fueled hopes that real change is coming. With the EFF gaining electoral ground 
and siphoning off would-be members of the ANC over time, Ramaphosa has taken action. His 
administration has announced plans to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation 
(Kumwenda-Mtambo, 2018). This would be a radical shift in policy from the willing-buyer, 
willing-seller model that has been in place since the Mandela era. Ramaphosa has reassured 
South Africans that this change would not cause violent land grabs, but would in fact help 
expand the economy and address the country’s growing unemployment rate (Madia, 2018). 
However, similar policies that allowed uncompensated land expropriation in Zimbabwe led to 
economic despair and destruction of property rights (see Footnote 4) so Ramaphosa and the 
ANC will need to design its new plan with care to avoid a similar tragedy. This dramatic 
legislative adjustment can be attributed to Ramaphosa’s fear that the EFF will grow larger, 
taking more former ANC members with it.  
 The following graph comes from a report on Land Redistribution in South Africa, 
commissioned by Parliament. Although the graph in Figure 1 is more relevant to agricultural 
than urban land, it shows how land redistribution has been measured over time, across different 
administrations. The Mandela era saw fewer transfers of land than other administrations, 
contrary to the hopeful notions and goals set by this administration. Actual land redistribution 
reached its peak near the end of Mbeki’s presidency and fell drastically during Zuma’s term, 
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although the report does note that figures for the 2016-2017 period at the time of publishing were 
incomplete. This graph does not cover land redistribution during Ramaphosa’s presidency since 
his inauguration in February 2018.  
 
Figure 1 - Taken from a 2016 report commissioned by the Parliament of South Africa on Land 
Redistribution in South Africa (32) 
  
II. Urban land 
 While most of the focus on land reform tends to be on rural land redistribution, urban 
areas are an essential aspect of the issue. While the most significant land inequalities exist in the 
rural sphere, segregation under apartheid shaped South Africa’s cities. Land reform requires not 
only a shift in how the government currently handles rural land, but also how they view the 
urban land where the majority of their citizens reside. Instead of redistributing public land in 
cities to benefit the most amount of people, this land is often sold by the government for profit 
(Pillay, 2018). Land in urban areas often becomes highly politicized, with opposing parties 
claiming they will work on new approaches to the urban landscape with no substantial progress 
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made from any side. Land reform needs to include a specific discussion of how to improve urban 
areas going forward. 
 Understanding the complexity of contemporary urban land issues requires some historical 
context. When the National Party came to power in 1948, they were committed to mandatory 
urban segregation and instituted the Group Areas Act of 1950, which substantially worsened 
South Africa’s inequalities in the urban sphere (Mabin, 1992). This commitment manifested two 
years later with comprehensive segregation policies, most notably the Group Areas Act, which 
proposed retroactive segregation, forcing black and coloured South Africans out of cities where 
they then resided (Mabin, 1992). These South Africans were forced to live in designated areas on 
the outskirts of cities commonly referred as townships. Although they had been forcibly 
relocated and now faced hours long commutes to the city, many black South Africans still had to 
make the trek into urban centers for work. The Act was calculated in this way; forcing black 
South Africans to live considerable distances from white South Africans in townships, but still 
able to work for them. This Act was not repealed until the fall of apartheid. 
Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has failed to integrate its urban communities and 
provide sufficient housing to the populations that suffered discrimination under apartheid. There 
were more than 1.5 million informal units in urban landscapes when the ANC came to power in 
1994 (Newton & Schuermans, 2013: 580). While the ANC tried to provide solid infrastructure 
for people living in these dwellings through fixed subsidies and construction projects, the 
subsidies were not adequate to cover the cost of building acceptable homes and actually 
reinforced residential segregation by attempting to build these new properties on the periphery of 
cities (Newton & Schuermans, 2013). The government did not give enough attention to the 
selection of sites or enough funds to cover actual construction of formal housing projects. From a 
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spatial perspective, developments in the private sphere have reinforced segregationist attitudes. 
This includes gated communities and barbed wire fences, which perpetuates fear and us versus 
them mentalities (Newton & Schuermans, 2013). There has been some integration in the urban 
sphere since 1991, but racial divides remain apparent in South African cities. Still more than 
40% of the urban population resides in townships (TTRI, 2007:4). This contributes to the 
extensive inequality in the country, as many black and coloured South Africans live as tenants on 
publicly owned land outside of cities in townships and white South Africans retain their own 
property within city limits.  
 
III. Land claims 
 This section will discuss how many land claims have been made, how many of those 
claims have been settled, and what motivates people to choose either land or monetary 
compensation once they reach settlement. Since 1994, many South Africans have been able to 
make claims to land that once belonged to them or their families, but was taken by whites during 
apartheid. To remedy consequences of dispossessed land, the ANC passed the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 very soon after coming to power (Beyers, 2016). This Act aimed to 
both recognize and compensate, financially or otherwise, individuals who had indeed lost land. 
As a caveat, this only includes land that was taken after the Natives Land Act of 1913 and not 
land that was taken during the initial colonial period.  
The original Act permitted claims to be filed until December 1998. By this date, South 
Africans had lodged a total of 63,455 claims. Later, this number jumped to 79,696 after realizing 
that many of the claims needed to be divided up (PLAAS, 2016: 10). Of these, 88% were based 
in urban areas, but rural claims involved substantially more people because they were submitted 
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by large groups. By 2001, the Land Claims Commission had only settled 12,314 of these cases 
(PLAAS, 2016:10). In 2009, the government claimed to have settled 75,787 of these claims, but 
most of these settlements involved monetary compensation rather than actual transfers of land 
(PLAAS, 2016: 11). An amendment to the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 2014 opened up 
land claims for another five years, which brought fears of an even less efficient settlement 
process with potentially up to 397,000 new claims surfacing; this amendment was actually struck 
down by the Constitutional Court, citing the likelihood that any new claims would cause claims 
made before the initial 1998 deadline to become even further backlogged (PLAAS, 2016: 13). 
The Court ordered that all of the people who submitted land claims in 1998 or before have 
priority over those who submitted their claims during the reopening period in 2014. The land 
reform process has been plagued by slow official processes and poor inter-department 
coordination (PLAAS, 2016). With the current governmental process and sheer amount of land 
claims, especially recently with new claims, researchers estimate that it would take at least 178 
years to finish the land claim process at its current pace (Magubane, 2018). 
When a land claim has reached the settlement stage, it does not necessarily mean that 
land will be transferred back to the beneficiaries. While it is nearly impossible to restore what 
was lost in its entirety, the Restitution of Land Rights Act included both remedial justice, or 
rectifying past historical wrongs, and distributive justice, or instituting equitable distribution of 
resources. The transfer of land from white South Africans to black South Africans is not merely 
reparations, but also reforms the physical landscape (Beyers, 2016). But, South Africans have the 
freedom to choose between land and financial compensation once their claim has reached the 
settlement stage. Land is actually the more valuable restitution award of the two, as it helps 
families build and maintain wealth over time (Atuahene, 2014a). However, most people choose 
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monetary compensation over actual transfer of land, perpetuating inequality and precluding 
distributive justice.  
 South Africans eligible to receive land, particularly in urban landscapes, prefer monetary 
compensation due to lack of faith in state institutions. In We Want What’s Ours: Learning from 
South Africa’s Land Restitution Program, Bernadette Atuahene displays her results from 
extensive research and interviews with more than 150 South Africans who have taken part in the 
nation’s land reform program. According to her research, there are seven primary reasons people 
choose monetary compensation: (1) the long and complicated process that many lack faith in, (2) 
if the urban land they once owned in an urban area was now undeveloped, they feared 
development was unlikely to happen, (3) lack of coordination between agencies, (4) the high 
employee turnover rate in the land commission office, (5) knowledge that project officers would 
shy away from development projects, (6) not wanting to move from their current location, and 
(7) money was easier to split between family members than a physical landscape (Atuahene, 
2014a: 146-149). Of these seven reasons that Atuahene cites, five include either ineffectiveness 
(2, 5) or inefficiency (1, 3, 4) in the land reform process.  
On the contrary, Atuahene discloses that people who actually took land over housing 
offered three leading explanations for their actions: (1) they wanted to retrieve what should have 
never been taken from them, (2) to respect cultural traditions, and the most common response (3) 
they felt this land was a delayed reward for a “hard-won fight” (Atuahene, 2014a: 158). This 
reiterates the value South Africans place on land. While many did not take the land they were 
offered because of government failure, those who did emphasized how important land was for 
their livelihoods. Many South Africans who have made land claims, particularly since 2014, 
have not had their claims processed and therefore have not seen an opportunity to choose 
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between land and financial compensation, but it is rational to assume that many would choose 
land if their government was both effective and efficient. Even when settling slow land claims, 
the government, headed by the ANC, cannot seem to fully satisfy beneficiaries, leaving a system 
of inequality intact. 
 
IV. Transition to the real consequences 
 Post-apartheid ANC governments have defined land reform based on three principles: (1) 
land restitution, (2) land redistribution, and (3) land tenure reform. Policy changes have been 
based around these premises. In the past, advances in land reform have constituted delayed 
justice, if justice is reached at all. Ineffective and inefficient land reform in South Africa has left 
many to suffer enduring injustice years after apartheid. The first three chapters have laid out the 
methods of injustice and how they have impacted the country as a whole. The overall results are 
clear; land reform in South Africa has not been the grand overhaul of the country’s landscape 
that many thought it would be once Mandela became president. The question now becomes, what 
does this lack of progress look like for a community or even an individual? 
 South Africa’s government functions at three primary levels: national, provincial, and 
local. These levels are at the same time distinct and connected, and are not meant to be seen as 
hierarchical. All divisions of government are also bound by the Constitution and by the national 
Parliament (ETU). This means that although the ANC is the ultimate authority over actions 
executed by the local government as the majority party, the local government has a great deal of 
autonomy in their decision-making. But, this thesis does not contend that the national 
government and local government are exactly the same in every aspect, just that the situation of 
land reform nationally is reflected at the local level through the Imizamo Yethu (“IY”) case 
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study. Government ineffectiveness and inefficiency as well as the attitudes of the elites involved 
in politics towards everyday South African citizens trickles down at every level of leadership. 
As I will discuss in the next chapter, IY is one example of a community that awaits 
justice in land reform, both prior and subsequent to March 2017 when their current trouble 
began. While their type of issue with land may not be included under the three-principle reform 
program, it portrays how land justice is delayed by the government. The situation this 
community finds themselves in can be explained by lasting inequality and failure of the 
government to ensure its citizens have access to basic needs and services. There has been no 
restitution, redistribution, or reliable land tenure for residents of IY. In fact, as the court 
documents will show, the government may think it is providing the community with what they 
need, but it is actually actively working against them, much like land policy. The urban 
landscape has notoriously evaded land reform due to how government policies and procedures 
have played out. The government has focused on rural land reform as a major source of 
inequality, even as unsuccessful as its policies have been. Urban residents who are able to access 
land reform programs have primarily chosen compensation over land transfer because they fear 
more interaction with governmental land processes. In the case of IY, the government has 
continually put minimal resources towards solving the community’s problems and demonstrated 
an attitude that refuses to respectfully involve community voices, similar to how land reform 
policy has functioned at the national level.  
IY is a township within an otherwise wealthy area on the far side of Cape Town. Their 
requests for basic services and proper roads have long been ignored by local commissions. When 
the government decided to move forward with plans to alter the community’s landscape, it did so 
without proper community input or consideration of how this would impact residents living in 
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the area. When the ANC failed to effectively and efficiently transform the South African 
landscape, it moved on with other projects and issues to solve without considering the critical 
consequences this action would continue to have for many South Africans in the future. Many 
South Africans are tired of the ANC’s approach to land reform in the past, much as IY residents 
are tired of the local government taking advantage of their vulnerable situation. Inequality 
resulting from continued inadequate land reform holds consequences not only for South Africa 
generally, but also for people at an individual level, as chapter four will show in the case of IY. 
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Chapter 4: Real Consequences for South Africans 
This chapter transitions from the broader picture of South African land reform to the land 
struggles of a particular South African community. Previous chapters have revealed how the 
ANC government has failed to meet the needs of its citizens in terms of land reform. Chapter 
three provided a legal and political framework for discussing land reform. Chapter four shows 
how this framework affects communities most severely impacted by inequality in South Africa. 
Cape Town remains one of the most segregated areas of South Africa, surpassing Johannesburg 
and most, if not all, other urban areas (Mwanza, 2018). This urban landscape has not seen 
meaningful integration since the 1990s, with most white people residing within city limits and 
black and coloured South Africans living outside of the main city center in townships. This 
chapter begins with personal observations and then shifts to historical and legal accounts of IY. 
Even though the legal case on behalf of IY does not deal with a land claim, there are still 
prevalent implications in how the government presently handles South Africans’ land claims. 
Although chapter four does not explicitly examine how IY ties into land reform generally, 
chapter five will include this analysis. 
 
I. Personal accounts of the case 
 I worked with the IY case personally during my study abroad in Cape Town. To my 
understanding, the LRC became involved with the case very suddenly, after the City of Cape 
Town (“the City”) had demolished some structures in the IY community with little warning after 
residents failed to leave the area following an eviction order. Residents were confused and 
scared, seeking out the LRC for help to see if there was anything it could do to fight the City’s 
eviction order. Although I typically helped with cases that involved gender equality, all of the 
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LRC’s interns were assigned to this urgent land matter. During one of the first days on the case, 
the lead attorneys asked for candidate attorneys and interns to come with them to IY for a 
evening meeting with the community about next steps.  
 I volunteered to go so I could experience the community we were working on behalf of 
with my own eyes. Almost all the previous work I had done involved clients indirectly, so this 
was an exciting opportunity for me. The meeting took place outside the home of a prominent 
community leader, Pamela Sofika. We drove up narrow, crowded roads to get to her home with 
people staring into our car the entire time, probably wondering what outsiders were doing in their 
community. Pamela welcomed us into her home, where the attorneys discussed plans for the 
impending meeting. Shortly after, the LRC attorneys spoke to the community about the situation, 
what the LRC was going to do to help, and how the community could help the LRC with the case 
in return. The primary attorney, a white man, spoke in English while another LRC attorney, a 
black woman, translated in isiXhosa through a megaphone. I could tell how worried the residents 
were about what could happen to their homes. They did not seem aggressive or unruly as the 
City would describe them in the case, but I can also understand how they might act differently 
around a group of lawyers hoping to help them rather than City officials demolishing their 
homes. At this meeting, the LRC attorneys informed the residents that they should bring a few 
community members to the LRC the following day to provide statements for the case, which 
would later become affidavits cited in section VI of this chapter. 
 With the IY residents coming into the office the following day, interns were also 
recruited to help take statements and write affidavits. Most of the IY residents who came in did 
not speak English fluently, so we sought help from native isiXhosa speakers all over our office, 
including candidate attorneys, the secretary, and the cleaning woman. I helped conduct an 
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interview with Thembela Liwani, who I will discuss more later. During our time together, he 
emphasized how he could not continue to support his family out of the structures that the City 
proposed to relocate him and his family to. He required only two more square meters of space for 
both his house and his plot so that he could keep selling meat out of the front of his house. I 
thought a lot that day about what the residents who came into the office were really asking for, 
which did not seem like much and certainly nothing unreasonable. It caused me to reflect on both 
their situation and the condition of South Africa as a whole, how people living in townships face 
repercussions from apartheid every single day and how almost all of it is out of their control. I 
am not going to say that I truly understand them because I cannot imagine what it is like to be 
their situation and have to fight for what they were fighting for, but I empathized with them and 
did my best to represent Thembela in the parts of his affidavit that I wrote.  
 After those 48 hours between visiting IY and producing affidavits, I had become invested 
in the case. When asked sometime later if I wanted to come to the IY court hearing, I agreed 
eagerly. Community leader Pamela Sofika along with another female IY resident sat proudly and 
anxiously on the LRC’s side of the courtroom. I do not remember if any other IY residents came 
to the court proceedings, but to travel from IY to the High Court of Cape Town would take at 
least a couple of hours by public transportation so I can assume that not many were able to make 
the trek. What I remember most prominently from the court hearing was the judge. He was a 
black man, who patiently heard summaries of both sides of the case and then paused a moment. 
Then he spoke to Pamela and the other resident in isiXhosa, their native language, for a while, 
before pressing on with questions for the attorneys in English. Although both Sofika and the 
other resident spoke English, this seemed to me as a sign of respect for them, that he wanted to 
make sure they understood what was happening and could have input in the courtroom that day. 
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Something so simple as speaking to the aggrieved residents in isiXhosa caused me to have a 
great deal of respect for him. Although nothing was resolved that day, the LRC attorneys ensured 
everyone that this was not typical behavior from a judge and this was a good sign for the future. 
Pamela and the other resident appeared to be happier walking out of the courtroom than when 
they first walked in. My journey with IY while in South Africa may have ended there, but both 
the case and my interest in South African land have endured over time. 
 
II. Introduction to Imizamo Yethu 
 Imizamo Yethu, also known simply as IY, is an informal settlement on the outskirts of 
Cape Town. This informal settlement, or township, spans upward onto the bottom of one of Cape 
Town’s mountains. Many of IY’s residents do not have access to basic services such as 
electricity and running water (Pietersen & Villiers, 2017). According to the 2011 census for the 
City of Cape Town, the population of IY was 15,538 people with 6,010 households (Western 
Cape). The population is assumed to have grown since the most recent census. Also in 2011, 
91.61% of residents in the township were black and 59.5% spoke isiXhosa as their first language 
(Western Cape). Only about 10.66% of the population spoke English as their first language, 
which of course is the language used in the South African judicial branch (Western Cape). The 
area for this population is only slightly more than half a square kilometer (Western Cape). Figure 
2 is a screenshot from the 2011 South African Census that reveals the layout of IY on an aerial 
map. 
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Figure 2 - Taken from the 2011 South African Census 
 IY sits between several mountains on the far side of Cape Town in a region called Hout 
Bay. This area is strikingly beautiful, but there is a stark division. The majority of Hout Bay 
contains well-established homes belonging to people who are comfortably wealthy, while IY is 
an extremely poor township. The land constituting IY is only a small fraction of the total 
landscape in the Hout Bay valley, yet these two land areas have roughly the same population 
(Miller, 2018). Traveling through the region, one can see how the wealthy parts of Hout Bay 
physically look down on IY from their side of the mountain. The land in Hout Bay is both 
beautiful and troubling, with about half of the population occupying the vast majority of the land. 
This reflects typical patterns in land ownership throughout the country. Figure 3 shows the 
contrast between IY and the rest of Hout Bay. It is also worth mentioning that since IY is a 
township, the land is publicly owned (Van Staden, 2016). IY residents are tenants of the 
government on the land they live on rather than the property owners. Because of this relationship 
between IY residents, the government, and the land, the government is free to manipulate the 
land IY rests on as it sees fit. 
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Figure 3 - Taken from a photo series by Johnny Miller 
 
 As previously mentioned, the IY community holds a dense population on very little land 
area. This means that the homes are very close together, which causes a wide variety of 
difficulties. The one that has most affected IY is fires. There is little to no running water in IY 
and currently no roads sufficient to provide access for emergency vehicles. When a fire starts in 
IY, it could go on for hours or even days, spreading deeply into the area. While IY has had fires 
before, none had been more disastrous than those that occurred on March 10 and 11, 2017. A fire 
that began in the evening hours of March 10 raged until the afternoon of the 11, destroying an 
estimated 3,500 homes and displacing thousands of residents (Harrison, 2017). After this fire, the 
City finally decided to act regarding the havoc fires had wreaked in the area by building proper 
roads. This process is called “super-blocking”7 and it requires the destruction of a few homes to 
build roads for emergency vehicles that will ultimately benefit the entire community. While IY 
                                                 
7 As defined by the City in their court case: “a process by which adequate spacing is created 
between informal structures which allows access for the provision of services such as water, 
electricity, sanitation as well as vehicular access for fire trucks, ambulances, paramedics, police, 
etc.” (The City v. Those Persons [...] and Those Persons [...]: 6).  
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residents had been asking for these roads for years, the City went about providing them in almost 
the worst way possible.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Photo of the March 2017 fires from HoutBay.org 
 
 
Figure 5 - Another close up view of the fires in March of 2017 from GroundUp.org 
 
During the court case, the LRC collected surveys from residents who would be affected 
by the super-blocking project. One hundred six residents completed the questionnaires. The LRC 
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utilized these results in Pamela Sofika’s original affidavit to reveal information about the average 
person living in the IY community who would have to relocate under the City’s plan. The results 
revealed: the average age was 38; 96% of people owned their shacks8; 85% were victims of the 
March 2017 fires; on average the person had been living in their present shack for 15 years9; 
about 70% were employed; and the average monthly income was R1614 (approximately 120 
USD) (8). Additionally, of the 106 residents who completed initial questionnaires, 17 of them 
claimed to be either elderly, disabled, or special needs. In total, the 106 residents had 58 children 
(8).  
During the first few months of this case, the City compiled a data set to verify 
information on 178 IY residents that it believed would ultimately be affected by its super-
blocking plan. This set of documents revealed some additional facts about the residents in 
question: 55% indicated that they were single, a little over half (52%) of those who marked their 
gender put down “male,” and on average they had between 3 and 4 dependents living with 
them.10 It is assumed that almost all, if not all, of the affected residents were black as IY is a 
black township. 
 When compared to statistics for South Africa as a whole, these numbers reveal that the 
people who would potentially be affected by the City’s super-blocking plan are not entirely 
different from the average black South African, and in some ways the IY residents are more 
vulnerable than most. According to the 2011 Census, 79.2% of South Africans were black and 
8.9% were white, confirming that black South Africans make up the vast majority of the country, 
                                                 
8 According to the residents’ own terms, in reality the City owns the land. 
9 Presumably meaning prior to the March 2017 fires if their shack was burnt down and then 
rebuilt. 
10 I put these responses by the residents into statistical form; the City included the information 
for a court hearing later in the process but did not use them as I have here.  
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which is also true for IY residents (17). Furthermore, the median age for black South Africans 
was 24 as compared to 38 for residents affected by super-blocking (Statistics South Africa, 2012: 
22). However, residents who filled out the first and second surveys from the IY case were adults 
and their average age does not account for children. Moreover, while the average annual income 
was R103,204 (approximately 7600 USD), the average annual income for black South Africans 
was R60,613 (approximately 4450 USD) (Statistics South Africa, 2012: 41-42). This is even 
much higher than the affected IY residents’ average annual income of R19,368 (approximately 
1425 USD) once calculated from their monthly income. The average national household size was 
3.6, compared to between 4 and 5 in IY homes affected by the super-blocking plan (Statistics 
South Africa, 2012: 56). 
 In sum, IY residents are poorer and have more dependents than the average South 
African or even average black South African. These are the same types of communities that have 
been subjected to issues obtaining land via the land claims process in the post-apartheid era. As 
discussed in the preceding three chapters, these South Africans, particularly those who have less 
access to resources, have faced government ineffectiveness and inefficiency for years in efforts 
to reclaim their land, much like how IY residents involved in this case have faced in their 
negotiations with the City.  
 
III. Legal proceedings filed by the City11 
 After the March 2017 fire, the City finally decided to help IY. It identified several 
structures for demolition in order to move forward with super-blocking. IY residents occupying 
                                                 
11 Because this thesis summarizes and analyzes a legal case, the parts of the case specifically 
mentioned here will paraphrase and simplify actual text from the case based on my own 
understanding. Any direct lines or language from the case will be cited using quotations. 
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these structures became the First Respondents in the case the City brought against the 
community. Specifically, these people live in the Dontse Yakhe and Shooting Range areas of IY, 
although those areas were not entirely demarcated for demolition. In its original motions, the 
City indicated that it would relocate the affected residents, but did not indicate its specific 
relocation plan. After the City claimed that its actions were met with hostility and pushback from 
IY residents, it decided to take legal action against the community. 
 The Second Respondents in the case were essentially residents who continued to erect 
structures on the demarcated areas and allegedly communicated threats to City officials 
regarding implementation of the super-blocking plan. The City claimed that the identities of both 
the First and Second Respondents were “unknown” to them. However, in spite of this 
uncertainty, the City’s initial filing sought six basic forms of relief for its efforts, many of which 
would profoundly affect the “unknown” individuals: (1) eviction of the First Respondents, (2) 
concrete date for their eviction, (3) enforcement of the eviction order even if residents refuse, (4) 
authorization for the applicant working with the sheriff to demolish and remove vacated 
structures, (5) restraint on the actions of the Second Respondents, and (6) authorization for the 
South African Police Service, better known as SAPS, to carry out the City’s plans as necessary 
(3). Along with these points, officials also asked that if its petition were granted that it would 
take effect immediately. Lastly, the City asked that “the costs of this application be paid by those 
Respondents who oppose the application, and ordering that their liability shall be joint and 
several, the one paying the others to be absolved” (5).12  
 In their case, the City attached minutes from several community meetings that it 
conducted within IY, both in the areas where the demolition was to take place and areas where 
                                                 
12 The information referenced in the preceding two paragraphs is taken from the Notice of 
Motion in The City v. Those Persons [...] and Those Persons [...] dated 11 August 2017.  
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residents were being temporarily housed by the City in wake of the fires. The City concluded 
from these meetings that the community was behind its plan, but still some residents had been 
resisting moving forward with super-blocking. The City claimed to have served eviction notices 
to respondents in the appropriate areas as well as affixed the order to some structures on August 
1, 2017 in both English and isiXhosa (101). Officials cited bad weather and terrain as 
implementation difficulties, but still alleged to have completed their requirements under the law. 
In handling the City’s requests, the Court called on the Respondents to acknowledge the City’s 
motion and for the court order to be delivered in person and read aloud to affected IY residents in 
both English and isiXhosa.13 
 
IV. Response by the Legal Resources Centre on behalf of Imizamo Yethu14 
 After increasing tensions between the City and IY residents, the LRC stepped in to 
defend the IY community in Court, particularly the Respondents. The initial primary evidence 
for its case came in the form of an affidavit from community leader Pamela Sofika. She claimed 
that the confrontations and violence described by the City are the result of the City’s failure to 
meaningful engage with IY residents affected by its plans. Her affidavit asserted that the City did 
not properly introduce its super-blocking plan to the appropriate residents as it alleged in their 
original motion. City officials did not respond to valid questions at community meetings either. 
Furthermore, the City indicated that the Respondents in the case are “unknown,” but Sofika 
emphasized that these people are not truly unknown to the City as they have had extended 
                                                 
13 The information referenced in the preceding paragraph is taken from the Founding Affidavit in 
The City v. Those Persons [...] and Those Persons [...] dated 11 August 2017 and the Draft 
Order dated 18 September 2017.  
14 The information referenced in this section is taken from the Answering Affidavit in the 
Eviction Application and the Founding Affidavit in the Residents Counter-Application in The 
City v. Those Persons [...] and Those Persons [...] dated 27 September 2017.  
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interactions already at this point in the proceedings. Frustrations with both the City and the 
March 2017 fire led residents to the hostility seen by city officials. While threats of violence 
from the residents are troubling, the City could have avoided a combative situation if it had tried 
to involve IY residents earlier on in the process without an order from the Court.  
 In her statement, Sofika continued to cite problems with the City’s relocation plan. First, 
she made sure to clarify that they have been given no details about relocation, which aligned 
with the lack of details in the City’s motion. Sofika also stated that there would be over 100 
households affected as opposed to the 96 estimated by the City. The LRC estimated that closer to 
120 households will need to be relocated, which is a substantially higher proportion (26). 
Additionally, the City hinted towards housing for residents in temporary relocation areas 
operating in wake of the March 2017 fires, but these areas were only meant to house residents for 
three months after March 2017 and construction of the City’s proposed road would take 
approximately six to nine months if not more (24). Sofika argued that the potential longevity of 
the resident’s relocation did not justify immediate eviction, especially without more serious 
communication by the City with IY residents.  
 Reflected in Sofika’s affidavit, the overarching motivation behind all of this and the IY 
residents’ reluctance to work with the City stemmed from a history of neglect from the 
government in their community coupled with unnecessary interdicts and evictions in IY. Many 
IY residents have not benefited from service delivery15, which had been previously promised by 
the government. IY residents are wary to trust the City because of its indifference towards the 
community in the past. Then, the City proposed to come in and alter many IY residents’ way of 
                                                 
15 Service delivery describes “the distribution of basic resources citizens depend on like water, 
electricity, sanitation, infrastructure, land, and housing” (Campbell, 2014). The South African 
government has an unreliable record of providing these services to communities in need, which 
have led to significant unrest in the past (Campbell, 2014).  
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life without proper explanation. At the starting point of the case, residents of IY had shown the 
same willingness to work with city officials as these officials had shown them.  
 
V. Analysis of motions filed 
 At first glance, the City did not appear to be taking any extreme action. In their filings, 
the City asserted its actions as reasonable and inclusive of community members. Officials placed 
blame on residents for refusing to work with them, or going back on their word once agreeing to 
their plans. However, after reading motions filed by the LRC, it is clear that the City had not 
been as cooperative with the community as it claimed to be. In fact, the City’s language revealed 
how removed officials are from the community. This came through specifically in the description 
of the Respondents in the case as “unknown.” As noted by the LRC and Pamela Sofika, the 
residents were not actually unknown to the City. If the City was truly prepared to work 
effectively with the community, then it would have appropriately documented information on the 
people impacted by their plans. Clearly, the City had not tried to get to know the residents in the 
area demarcated for demolition or the challenges these residents may face in relocation to an 
unspecified location.  
 Other evidence of the City’s attitude towards IY residents came with its inaccurate 
account of the number of households that would need to be relocated under the City’s plan. 
While the City claimed only 96 structures would be affected in its plan, in actuality 
approximately 120 structures would require location. While this number may seem frivolous at 
first glance, it indicates the extent to which the City had had contact with the community and 
included community members in their discussions. Twenty more structures imply at least 20 
more families, which potentially entails a substantial number of additional residents. The City’s 
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inaccurate count of affected structures, in addition to the City identifying the Respondents as 
“unknown” in its case, proves the points made by Sofika in her affidavit: the City’s efforts to 
include the IY community in its super-blocking plan had been insufficient. 
 Sofika highlighted another important point towards the end of her affidavit. She stated 
clearly that “the housing situation in Imizamo Yethu had been neglected by the City for a 
number of years…” and went on to cite service delivery and relocation as burdens the City had 
placed on IY residents recently and over the years (25).16 As Sofika said, residents of IY should 
not be subjected to an unfair resettlement process simply because they are poor and do not have 
the same access to resources as other communities may have. This specific phrasing revealed the 
City’s neglect of IY residents not only recently, but for years. The City even asked the Court to 
have the IY residents who opposed its motion, already some of the most financially 
disadvantaged people in the region, to pay the cost of the application, revealing just how out of 
touch the City is with the reality of the residents’ situation. According to Sofika, the City had 
continually failed the IY community and acted unreasonably in their efforts to solve the housing 
dilemma due to their own super-blocking plan. In short, why should the IY community have 
trusted that the City had their best interests at heart when the City had been so apathetic in the 
past? This sentiment is at the center of both the IY community’s struggle against the City and at 
the national level in land reform generally.  
There has been significant back and forth in this case since its formal beginning back in 
August 2017. After the LRC filed its initial response to the City’s motion, the City disputed 
Pamela Sofika’s affidavit with an additional affidavit from Gisela Noelle Kaiser, the Executive 
                                                 
16 Quote taken from the Answering Affidavit in the Eviction Application and the Founding 
Affidavit in the Residents Counter-Application in The City v. Those Persons [...] and Those 
Persons [...] dated 27 September 2017.  
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Director of Informal Settlements Water and Waste Directorate for the City. She refuted many of 
the claims made by Sofika and also questioned Sofika’s standing as a respondent in this case, as 
she will not be directly impacted by the proposed road. Specifically, Kaiser questioned the 
accuracy of the numbers from the LRC’s surveys, asserted that the City had indeed had 
meaningful engagement with IY residents, and claimed that the City’s plans for relocation are 
valid, including a provision for 3 x 3 meter structures on 4 x 4 meter plots.17  
 In response to the City’s filing on 14 October 2017, the LRC filed the affidavit of 
Antoinette Markram, a Principal Legal Adviser at the LRC. She explained then-recent 
communications between the City and IY residents, alluding to the fact that the primary cause of 
discourse between these parties is the physical size of the structures the City planned to build and 
that most of these structures had not actually been built yet. The City proposed a 3 x 3 meter 
structures on a 4 x 4 meter plot and the affected IY residents requested 5 x 5 meter structures on 
6 x 6 plots. She concluded by stating that everyone agrees that the roads are necessary and 
urgent, however, the parties did not agree on the solution for the road’s construction.18 
 After Markram’s affidavit, there continued to be a lot of affidavits filed on one side or 
another that mostly served to argue against what the other side had said in their previous motion. 
Both the City and the IY residents stood firm in their beliefs about the appropriate size for 
structures in the areas the City will relocate the residents to. The LRC cited problems with how 
the City is handling relocation and how its current plans would not be suitable for residents, 
while the City claimed exactly the opposite. There are email exchanges, more affidavits from 
affected IY residents from the LRC, PowerPoints, and meeting notes all annexed in the case file. 
                                                 
17 The information referenced in this paragraph is taken from the Replying Affidavit in The City 
v. Those Persons [...] and Those Persons [...] dated 14 October 2017.  
18 This information is taken from the Supplementary Affidavit in The City v. Those Persons [...] 
and Those Persons [...] dated 26 October 2017.  
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There were multiple orders from the judge and postponements of the case. The LRC also 
mentioned accounts of armed officers present at meetings between the City and the IY residents, 
which the IY residents were notably uncomfortable with, leading to both further delays in the 
process and controversy between the two groups. The presence of police officers elevated the 
level of distrust between the two parties, and appeared to be an attempt by the City to reaffirm its 
power over the residents. This also speaks to whom the police serve; the primary responsibility 
of the police is the protection of the people, but when citizens feel more uncomfortable when the 
police are around than when they are absent, this speaks to a larger narrative of distrust between 
black South Africans and the police. The City is aware of this troubled relationship and chose to 
bring police officers to the meeting anyway, signaling further refusal to engage with the needs of 
the community. 
 Another prominent impediment in the case was the City’s verification process for 
residents who would need to be relocated, so the City would have accurate information regarding 
the affected residents and would not be ill-informed in completing the relocation process. The 
LRC did not receive this information from the City until March 2018, more than four months 
after the City originally planned to begin the verification process in October 2017 and more than 
six months after the case began. Over the initial few months of this case, the City moved ahead 
with what it thought residents needed, while the LRC asserted that what the residents needed did 
not align with what the City was willing to provide. Overall, the proceedings in this case have 
been slow, contentious, and reluctant.  
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VI. What eviction could mean19 
 Those who would be affected by evictions for super-blocking are validated in their claims 
that the plan the City offered originally could lead to devastating results for them and their 
families. In the City’s original plan, officials were firm in the fact that the structures for 
relocation would have to be 3 x 3 meter structures. The areas City officials marked for relocation 
were Disa, Depot, and Triangle,20 but only a fraction of the structures for relocation on these 
sites had been constructed.21 The City offered to build permanent structures for the residents and 
grant them access to basic services in the new location after relocation.  
The LRC offered six affidavits from various community members supporting its case in 
the suit. The affidavits mentioned here are all dated September 26, 2017. Five out of six residents 
in these affidavits were victims of the March 2017 fire and their newly rebuilt structures had 
been designated for demolition under the proposed super-blocking plan. Furthermore, many of 
them noted that at the time of the affidavit the City had not restored access to basic services22 
since the fires occurred in March 2017. Many of the residents mentioned a relocation of residents 
on Molokwane Street23 as reason for their apprehension to go through with the City’s plan. 
Approximately ten years prior, the City placed residents from Molokwane Street in temporary 
structures with promises to provide them with proper housing that were never fulfilled. Thelela 
                                                 
19 The information referenced in this section is taken from the Affidavits of Thelela Sifuba, 
Wiseman Duma, Thembela Liwani, Nomangaliso Fumbana, James Nkhoma, and Mfana Calydon 
Kwatshube in The City v. Those Persons [...] and Those Persons [...] dated 26 September 2017.  
20 It is unclear if this area is still within Imizamo Yethu. 
21 This information is taken from the Supplementary Affidavit in The City v. Those Persons [...] 
and Those Persons [...] dated 26 October 2017.  
22 Five community members who submitted affidavits had access to water and plumbing prior to 
the March 2017 fires, and three of those residents had access to electricity as well. One resident 
did not have access to any basic services. Additionally, it is unknown to the me whether or not 
access to these services has been restored since the affidavits were filed in September 2017.  
23 Presumably still within Imizamo Yethu, but not explicitly stated.  
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Sifuba’s main opposition to the proposed super-blocking project stemmed from her distrust of 
City officials, specifically in regards to Molokwane Street; Sifuba wanted the land designated for 
relocation to be made “livable” before they moved there, and be equipped with basic services. 
Another resident named Wiseman Duma discussed frustrations that he had had no individual 
engagement with City officials carrying out the project and his questions were not addressed in a 
way that he could understand. Duma lives in a house with four adults and three children, and the 
3 x 3 meter structures the City intended to move residents to would not be sufficient for his 
family.  
Additionally, Thembela Liwani insisted that City officials had not communicated with 
him about their plans specifically and reiterated that the City did not seem open to discuss other 
options with residents other than its proposed plan. At the time of his affidavit, Liwani lived in a 
6 x 6 meter plot structure where he was able to operate a meat business out of his front yard 
before the March 2017 fires. His inability to continue operations had already put a financial 
strain on his family, and any plot less than 6 x 6 meters would further hinder their financial 
situation. Nomangaliso Fumbana’s structure was not affected by the March 2017 fires, but her 
structure had been designated for demolition. She stated that when her house was being marked 
for demolition, she asked City officials why they were marking her structure and officials stated 
that they only communicate with community leaders on these matters. Similarly to Liwani, 
Fumbana ran a business out of her home. As her business and primary source of income, 
Fumbana provided childcare for neighbors. She would need at least a 5 x 5 meter structure to 
continue to operate her business. James Nkhoma also supported his family out of a home-
operated business selling fish and chips, fruits, and vegetables. The City came to Nkhoma asking 
him to sign papers consenting to his eviction and when he refused, the City official stated that he 
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would be evicted in eight days anyway. Nkhoma, like Fumbana and Liwani, cannot operate his 
business out of a structure that is 3 x 3 meters. Mfana Claydon Kwatshube made and sold shoes 
out of a table outside his home. Not only would a structure that is less than 5 x 5 meters be 
insufficient to hold his family of five and operate his business, but Kwatshube needs to be in a 
well-populated area so people walking by can see his business. No one from the City has 
communicated with him regarding the eviction and relocation. 
 Of the six community members who filed affidavits, four would have not only their 
livelihoods affected by relocation to an unspecified area with only 3 x 3 meter structures, but 
also their family’s incomes. Only two directly communicated with City officials, and both 
seemed to have their concerns ignored. Many live with large families, who would not be able to 
live adequately in a structure that is only 3 x 3 meters, as all of them lived in structures that were 
at least 5 x 5 meters at the time. Again, residents were not refusing to move, rather they needed 
the City to compromise with them on the circumstances of their relocation. In adding to their 
grievances with City officials handling the IY super-blocking project, these affidavits showed 
how eviction would impact residents on an individual level. This took a step back from the 
bigger picture to examine how the City would be altering the lives of each person who lived in 
one of the 120 structures designated for demolition, and what was at risk for these people, 
whether that be a business selling shoes or being able to care for neighborhood children.  
 The information I have on this case only includes what was filed up until May 2018, 
which is all that I have described here. To my understanding, the case is still ongoing and a final 
compromise has not yet been reached. The two sides are working together more over time, but 
there are also some aspects neither may be willing to compromise on. In the chapter that follows, 
the conclusion, I will discuss how this case mirrors wider land reform and governmental attitudes 
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towards land in South Africa, and what the future may look like for residents of IY and South 
Africans everywhere.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The IY case is not extraordinary; evictions occur all over South Africa because many 
people are not the legal owners of the property on which they live. However, IY residents have 
been able to fight back through the same legal systems that deny them rights to their property. 
The first three chapters contextualized South African land and showed how land reform has 
functioned since the end of apartheid, or more accurately, not functioned. Chapter four 
demonstrated that the City has not effectively engaged IY residents in their super-blocking 
process and is more concerned with implementing their plan than ensuring residents’ needs are 
met. This chapter connects those two pieces together, describing how government 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency in IY mirrors the national conversation around land. I argue, as I 
have throughout this thesis, that land reform has been both ineffective and inefficient, creating 
the worst problems for the most vulnerable South Africans most impacted by extreme inequality. 
Furthermore, this chapter also discusses the future of land-related justice for both IY and South 
Africa.  
 
I. Relating to the broader perspective 
 The IY case speaks to land reform nationally in several distinct ways. The first of these 
involves the affected individuals. While claiming to represent the interests of all South Africans 
who suffered under apartheid, the ANC constantly fails to help citizens who could benefit most 
from land reform. As discussed in chapter four, in most significant demographic categories IY 
residents are either similar to the average South African or more disadvantaged. IY residents 
have drastically lower incomes and more dependents than a typical citizen, coupled with a 
greater need for access to basic services. Clearly, IY residents constitute one of the more 
 
 
65 
vulnerable populations amongst South Africans. By attempting to do what is best for IY (i.e. 
super-blocking), the City is actually taking advantage of this community. This situation reflects 
the shortcomings of land reform nationally and how it has failed to help those who are most in 
need. 
 IY residents find themselves in a position comparable to many who have been affected by 
dysfunctional land reform. The land inequality in Hout Bay, the area in which IY resides, is 
extreme, but not unique. South Africa is the most unequal nation in the world (World Bank, 
2018). Living under the shadows of the Hout Bay mansions that physically look down on their 
community is a daily reminder of this inequality to IY residents in their everyday lives. Having 
been mistreated by the City not only recently, but also in the past, IY residents have lost faith in 
the City as an entity prepared to help them rather than harm them. IY residents no longer depend 
on the City as a resource, just as South Africans do not count on their government to function in 
their favor. As I will discuss later in this chapter, South Africans are turning away from the ANC 
for assistance and toward more radical political parties like the EFF.  
 The ANC-led government has been both ineffective and inefficient in implementing post-
apartheid land reform, exacerbating the substantial inequality in the country. Their 
ineffectiveness is illustrated by the negligible amount of land that has actually been redistributed 
since 1994, an amount that does not nearly approach their initial goal of redistributing 30% of 
land within the first five years of their rule. Additionally, even of the South Africans who have 
endured the land claims process in its entirety, many have chosen financial compensation over 
actual land transfer because they are not confident in the government’s ability to transfer the land 
back to them within a reasonable time frame. In essence, the government’s ineffectiveness has 
caused widespread distrust.  
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This sense of distrust is not unlike IY residents’ attitude towards the City. The City has 
promised them time and again that it would give all residents access to basic services, but none 
have materialized. Everyone accepts that the roads proposed by the super-blocking plan are 
necessary, but the two conflicting sides remain unable to reach an agreement. While not opposed 
to the idea of relocation, IY residents are at odds with the City over the conditions of their 
displacement. Residents require an adequate plot of land with a structure already built for them 
upon arrival, not promises that the structure will be built eventually. They suspect that the City 
will not follow through on this agreement, which has been a major factor in their ongoing legal 
battle. This distrust speaks to land reform at a national level, principally how distrust between 
citizens and the government has led many South Africans towards choosing financial 
compensation, the less valuable restitution award. If the government functioned effectively, this 
compromise would not be necessary. Tension between the people and the government, both 
nationally and locally, is a direct result of the government’s ineffectiveness. The government 
cannot protect the best interests of the people if there exists no certainty behind its actions.  
 Besides showing itself ineffective, the ANC government has proved inefficient. It has yet 
to achieve its goals in land reform, and will not anytime soon unless the party drastically changes 
its approach. Some people who filed land claims before the 1998 deadline are still awaiting 
justice. Citizens have admitted that they are hesitant to continue with the land claims process 
because of the sluggish government processes surrounding land. For similar reasons regarding 
inefficiency, the IY case remains unsolved today. In the case, the City continually postponed the 
verification process, exacerbating delays. IY residents remain uncertain of their future, just as 
many South Africans do not see an end to their struggles in obtaining redistributed land. 
 
 
67 
Inefficiencies have added to reservations citizens hold toward their elected officials and caused 
IY residents and South Africans to be wary when interacting with the government. 
  Although the national government holds the ultimate authority all levels of government, 
the City and the national government are separate entities that are not fully intertwined with one 
another. However, their attitudes towards residents under their jurisdiction, particularly in 
regards to land justice, conveys a common sentiment reflected throughout South African politics; 
disconnect with the people and inability or unwillingness to give the people what they need. In 
addition to the ineffectiveness and inefficiency shown by both the government and the City, 
inequality is an overarching theme in IY locally and the City nationally. This inequality is 
apparent through data and statistics as well as plainly on the South African landscape. Unequal 
land distribution is a problem nearly everywhere in South Africa, whether in Hout Bay where IY 
is located, in other parts of Cape Town, across the country in Johannesburg, in rural farmland, or 
elsewhere. The solutions to this problem must involve significant advances in land reform, not 
simply promises or goals. In IY, the City needs to guarantee that relocated residents will have 
access to basic services and sufficient housing, not just promises that this will happen. IY is not a 
community seeking reparations for a land claim, but they are searching for help from their 
government. So far, they have been dismissed rather than helped, like South Africans who have 
turned to their government for help for years with little to no avail. At both the national and local 
level, the government has worked against the people who are most in need rather than working 
with them. An elitist attitude apparent throughout all levels of government since the fall of 
apartheid has allowed the land questions to remain unresolved. The government, whether 
national or local, must be held responsible for correcting extensive inequality, and in South 
Africa this starts with an examination into land reform. 
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II. What does the future look like? 
In considering the future for IY residents and South Africans in general, it is important to 
consider factors that fell beyond the scope of this thesis. First, there are far more issues within 
the South African government besides its inability to produce effective land policy. For example, 
Zuma’s administration was plagued by corruption scandals that eventually forced him to leave 
office. The country is still recovering from Zuma’s presidency and trying to move forward. Also, 
some South Africans awaiting changes in land reform policy are more disadvantaged than others. 
Gender and other identities add complexities and new levels to the land discussion. This thesis 
did not include a comprehensive history of IY or of townships in general. Particularly for IY, 
there are certain circumstances beyond the current eviction case that have caused tension 
between the City and residents in the past, primarily protests that have gone on for years over 
insufficient access to basic services and government neglect of their situation. I did not include 
these protests in this thesis because they were related to service delivery rather than evictions, 
but they are still somewhat relevant to the IY community’s relationship with the local 
government. While these topics are relevant for South Africans in what is to come, what I have 
already discussed will be the most significant determinations for the future of land. 
The IY case is ongoing and the final solution that will bring sufficient roadways to the 
community and satisfy relocated residents is not yet clear. Over the course of the case, both sides 
have had to come to terms with the reality of the situation; IY needs proper roads, but not 
everyone agrees how to go about building those roads. IY and the LRC have placed pressure on 
the City to devise a reasonable plan that would gain approval from all sides. The prospects for IY 
residents are more hopeful than they would have been without intervention from the LRC, but it 
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is still uncertain whether the City will be required to follow through on its promises and provide 
residents with an appropriate living situation. 
At the height of their issues with the City, residents turned to the LRC as a possible 
solution, or at least better alternative, for their problems. Likewise, South Africans frustrated 
with the ANC’s land reform program are turning to the EFF as their solution. The LRC and the 
EFF do not share the same mission; the LRC is a legal firm that intervenes where it sees fit, and 
the EFF is a political party pursuing power to implement its policies. However, despite their 
dissimilarity, the LRC and the EFF represent the same idea to IY residents and black South 
Africans everywhere: hope. Both the LRC and the EFF will be crucial actors in determining the 
future of IY residents and South African citizens everywhere.  
South Africa is at a crossroads. ANC policies have produced ineffective and inefficient 
land reform, and the country remains vastly unequal. The citizens will have to choose between 
keeping with this status quo, a moderate party that willingly adhered to World Bank regulations 
and failed to reach their goals, but promises to improve the country’s situation in the future, or 
make a radical switch to an opposing party that advocates far-left policies and is not afraid to 
take drastic action. Whatever the country chooses to do will have a lasting impact, which could 
be as devastating as the results in Zimbabwe or could finally obtain success and move the 
country in the right direction. Overall, the future depends on the people of South Africa and how 
they see what is best for their country moving forward.  
 
IV. Final thoughts 
“As long as poverty, injustice, and gross inequality persist in our world, none of us can truly 
rest.” -Nelson Mandela 
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Before I started this thesis, I did not realize the extent to which the ANC had failed South 
Africans over the last few decades. Even a great and heroic leader like Nelson Mandela was 
unable to make change in land policy that would correct past wrongdoings of apartheid. He was 
a great man with powerful ideas that inspired people all over the world, but still South Africans 
suffered injustice under his rule. No one expected over 40 years of apartheid, not to mention the 
centuries long colonialism prior, to be completely rectified within one president’s terms, but no 
one anticipated the disarray the country’s political and economic system would come to under 
the ANC either.  
Simply put, South Africa is not the country that ANC revolutionaries of anti-apartheid 
activism imagined. South Africa needed time to heal after as devastating a regime as apartheid, 
and now the governments’ time is up. All in all, land is a complex and contested topic both in IY 
and South Africa. In South Africa, land and politics are invariably intertwined with the broader 
problems of land and justice. The lasting effects of apartheid are apparent throughout the 
country’s landscape and without serious change in the future, these effects will continue on for 
years, decades, and generations to come. Without reform, the legacy of inequality will live on, 
evading justice for the most vulnerable South Africans. I have seen firsthand how all of these 
issues exist in unison through the IY case. There is no obvious solution as to what should be 
done, but one thing is clear: as long as these problems persist, South Africans must keep fighting 
to redress modern day apartheid. 
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